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AN AMBIGUOUS ADVENTURE: 
MUSLIM ORGANISATIONS AND THE DISCOURSE OF 





The article explores how the process of appropriating the discourse of 'develop- 
ment' by Muslim organisations and 'NGOs' might be a factor in the construction 
of new forms/contexts of Muslim political participation in Senegal. By promoting 
'Islamic development', Muslim organisations have moved into a discursive field 
that was previously the fief of the secular state. It is shown how the discourse of 
'development' and 'Islam' and the interplay between them are functional in the 
context of competition and negotiation amongst political actors in Senegal. The 
result observed is very complex and multifaceted. By claiming 'Islamic develop- 
ment' and playing with the content of these two concepts according to the power- 
political context, 'Muslim' organisations and personalities claim political space from 
the 'secular' state as well as from each other. 
The discourse of 'development' has always had a prominent place in 
the Senegalese polity. Development was the very raison d'etre of the post- 
independence governments: the Parti Socialiste, in power from 1960 
until the 'elections de l'alternance' in 2000, called itself 'PS-Parti du 
Developpement'. As in many African states, 'development' as it was con- 
ceived by the new bureaucratic elite was essentially a top-down process. 
A vanguard of trained bureaucrats was to lead Senegal and its citizens 
to modernity and prosperity. The state ruled by these bureaucrats was 
of a singularly Jacobin nature and was the only legitimate agency to 
interpret reality and to determine future actions. Although the top- 
down approach became less prominent after the early 1980s because 
of lack of means and the subsequent austerity measures imposed by 
the International Monetary Fund, the bureaucratic elite seems to have 
tried jealously to guard its prerogative. 
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While it is therefore not surprising that most studies have focused 
on the state role of development-and donors have followed suit-the 
dynamics non-state actors generate have until recently been under- 
played. This presentation looks at 'development' from the perspective 
of non-governmental organisations, more specifically at the discourse 
and activities of Muslim organisations. It explores how Muslim organ- 
isations talk about 'development' and how the discourse is matched 
with praxis. Analysis of the role of non-governmental organisations is 
important both for what it can reveal about political processes and the 
patterns of power and participation that underlie them and for what 
it might reveal about the construction of political space within a soci- 
ety. While 'Islamic' political parties are still constitutionally forbidden 
in Senegal, Islamic associations and NGOs are thriving and involved 
in a dynamic, often ambiguous relationship with state actors or agen- 
cies and each other. These organisations are not political movements 
sensu stricto, therefore are not directly involved in the 'high politics' of 
the Senegalese polity.2 Yet, individual members sometimes are, and 
through their activities (or even activism) Islamic associations and indi- 
vidual Muslims do have a relevant political impact. 
The scope of this particular paper will be limited to one aspect of 
the construction of political space. It presents some observations based 
on interviews with prominent members of Muslim organisations con- 
ducted in Dakar, Thies and Kaolack in June-July 1999. It is an attempt 
to explore how the process of appropriating the discourse of 'develop- 
ment' by Muslim organisations might be a factor in the construction 
of new forms/contexts of Muslim political participation. By promoting 
'Islamic development' Muslim organisations have moved into a discur- 
sive field that was previously the fief of the secular state. Using the 
development discourse provides Muslim organisations and individuals 
with a powerful tool to attack state 'development' policy. It also pro- 
vides Muslim organisations with the opportunity of accessing networks 
and resources (including state subsidies) they otherwise would not have 
access to. On the other hand, it entails the danger of losing the unique 
position of being aloof from political struggle and of being co-opted by 
other political actors as subcontractors in their 'development' policy. 
What does the discourse of Muslim organisations on 'development' sug- 
gest? How do they see 'development'? Do they have their own con- 
ception, which is fundamentally different from any other? Do Muslim 
organisations differ amongst themselves concerning the meaning and 
content of 'development'? Are they perhaps staunch adversaries of state 
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'development' policy? Or is their positioning more a matter of (re-) 
negotiation rather than of competition? 
1. Muslim organisations 
There exist a great many Muslim organisations in Senegal and their 
number has been steadily rising since the so-called Renouveau Islamique 
in the late 1970s. Although the upsurge in Islamic fervour is often asso- 
ciated with the rise of Islamism, as it has led to a massive increase of 
non-tariqa associations, the tariqas shared in the success. Many associ- 
ations were set up by representatives of the tariqas and many taalibes 
are members of an Islamic association. The new associations deploy a 
whole range of activities. Some of them are mainly concerned with 
Qur'anic study, others organise conferences on current affairs or devote 
themselves to political activism. Certain associations conduct social work 
in their communities, organise health care, set up schools, others yet 
are merely involved in preaching. Muslim associations can be so-called 
'reformist' organisations, but they can also be organisations directed by 
marabouts, associations of Muslim intellectuals or charitable organisa- 
tions as well as officially registered Islamic 'development NGOs'.3 
There does not exist a general overview or list of Senegalese Muslim 
organisations that have 'development' as one of their objectives. The 
ones that are officially registered as NGOs are sometimes members of 
the Conseil des Organisations Non-Gouvemementales d'Appui au Developpement 
(CONGAD), the collective of Senegalese and Foreign NGOs working 
in Senegal.4 Most of the NGOs are not members: one CONGAD 
official declared that 'Islamic'5 NGOs are for several reasons rather 
marginalised within the organisation. The relation between the pre- 
dominantly secular Senegalese and international membership of CON- 
GAD and the 'Islamic' NGOs is somewhat uneasy (Mohamad Seidou 
Ba, 5 July 1999). The principles of CONGAD do not directly appeal 
to them, although de facto they would not have a problem adhering 
to them. Another reason for the small number of 'Islamic' member 
NGOs is reportedly obstruction of such NGOs by the state authorities 
for reasons of national security (Mme Gaye, 1 July 1999). A few NGOs 
have some problems with financial control and accountability and were 
not admitted to CONGAD for that reason. The problem of corruption 
is said to be widespread amongst Islamic NGOs (Mohamad Seidou Ba, 
5July 1999). The president of CONGAD, Abdou Salam Fall, pointed 
out that the small number of Islamic NGOs that were members 
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were the fiefs of sons of marabouts. These organisations, however, are 
not very strong or sustainable (Abdou Salam Fall, 1 July 1999). The 
big international NGOs such as the Saudi Organisation Islamique de Secours, 
the Kuwaiti Zakat House or the World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
(WAMY) are not members of CONGAD. These organisations rarely 
participate operationally in development projects: they provide the 
funding, but the project is carried out by local Senegalese NGOs. It has 
been suggested that the international NGOs avoid co-operation with 
associations that have an overtly 'political' agenda, to prevent internal 
struggle between Muslim associations, but also to prevent problems and 
complications with the government (Mohamad Seidou Ba, 5 July 1999). 
Islamic organisations and 'NGOs' are thus largely excluded from the 
mainstream development community. Nevertheless, numerous Muslim 
organisations are conducting activities amongst urban and rural com- 
munities. Although the activities conducted by the Muslim associations 
are not always designated by those organisations as 'development' activ- 
ities, some of them can certainly be considered as such. These associ- 
ations also construct their own implicit or explicit interpretation of and 
judgement about 'development' as they see and experience it. Therefore 
the organisations discussed below include officially registered 'develop- 
ment' NGOs as well as others. They are organised according to their 
main field of activity: schooling, socio-cultural activities and (reproduc- 
tive) healthcare. 
2. Schooling 
Religious schooling is an issue of major concern among Senegalese 
Muslims. While Islam is traditionally taught in Qur'anic schools under 
the responsibility of a marabout, other forms of religious education have 
emerged over the last few decades, mainly instigated by reformist organ- 
isations such as the Union Culturelle Musulmane (UCM) of Cheikh Toure( 
(Loimeier 2000: 174). Examples of 'modern' religious education are 
notably the so-called ecolesfranco-arabes, which, as well as religious study, 
also include French and other subjects in their curriculum. Today many 
organisations are active in the field of 'modern' religious education. 
Although it is indisputable that an overwhelming proportion of Senegalese 
Muslims think religious education is important and necessary, in prac- 
tice it is, just like the Qur'anic schools, also a last resort for the young 
who for whatever reason have no access to the official school system 
(Fall 1993: 200). The reformist Jama'aatu Ibadu Rahmane (JIR, Associa- 
tion of the Servants of the Merciful) has made education its primary 
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vocation. Yet, tariqa-based organisations too, such as the Federation des 
Associations islamiques du Senegal (FAIS) and the Union pour le Progres islamique 
au Sinegal (UPIS),6 an association close to the PS, have since long devel- 
oped educational activities and run an (unknown7) number of schools. 
The JIR was founded by dissidents of the UCM. It is currently one 
of the most developed and organised reformist organisations and prob- 
ably the one with the most extended membership. It has branches all 
over the country. The schools run by the JIR are all Franco-Arab 
schools located in Thies ('Bilal' and 'El Hadj Omar Tall'), in Dakar 
('Imam Malick' and 'Abdallah Bin Yassin'), in Sebikotane ('An Nour') 
in Rufisque ('al Dahwa') and in Louga. The director of the Ecole Imam 
Malick in a popular quarter of the capital (Dakar-Medina) emphasised 
that he considers his work in education 'as his responsibility towards 
his Creator, the children, the parents, but also the state' (by which, he 
said, he meant 'the Senegalese', and not necessarily the government). 
'The development of the country depends on the quality of the edu- 
cation it offers to future generations', he emphasised. As the state is 
not capable of offering this education (especially not the religious edu- 
cation essential for the JIR), the JIR takes this task to heart, because 
'celui qui ne s'interesse pas aux affaires des musulmans n'est pas des notres' (Mr 
Diaw, 2 July 1999). After primary school the pupils enter the compe- 
tition for a place at secondary school, and possibly go on to one of 
JIR's secondary schools. After the baccalaureat, however, they are free 
to pursue any career. The schools are not geared towards the training 
of militants for the movement, but to the education of 'citoyens respecta- 
bles et respectueux des principes islamiques' (Dieye 1994: 31). The director of 
Imam Malick added that the pupils are not exclusively children of 
devout members of the JIR, but come from all layers of the social and 
political spectrum and that 'even some children of ministers and mili- 
tary go to JIR schools'. The movement insists that the schools have a 
good reputation, and pass rates are claimed to be very high compared 
to those in the official system. 
As for their financial resources, the schools rely on contributions from 
the parents, which makes for a difficult situation. The School in Dakar- 
Medina is planning to move out of the area, because the rent for the 
premises is too expensive. The state does not subsidise the JIR schools. 
This is not for ideological or political reasons, but because the schools 
are not recognised, said the Secretary-General of the JIR. The schools 
have the legal status of being 'authorised' by the state as regular pri- 
vate schools (just like other secular or Catholic private schools). To gain 
the status of being 'recognised', and thus to be entitled to subsidies, 
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the school has to pay social contributions which are quite high and 
not all private schools have that financial possibility. Only one of the 
JIR's schools ('Bilal' in Thies) has gained such 'recognition'. Not being 
recognised does not, however, mean that there is no inspection on the 
part of the state concerning standards of teaching and compliance with 
the official curriculum. The pupils pay fees, but these are not very high 
(2500-3500 Francs CFA per annum, the equivalent of k2.50-3.50) and 
in special circumstances the fees can be waived.8 The rest of the work- 
ing budget is said to be drawn partly from the regular contributions 
of members of the JIR, who pay 2% of their income or salary to the 
movement (Mamadou Sall, 12 July 1999). 
The source of funding for the Franco-Arab schools, and especially 
the amount of funding involved, is notably difficult to pin down. JIR, 
but also FAIS and UPIS, are sparing with information concerning this 
issue (Gomez-Perez 1999: 65). Gomez-Perez and Vuarin (1990: 612) 
suggest that a considerable share comes from the Arab world. As a 
large share of funding comes from outside Senegal, state subsidies are 
not really an issue for the Franco-Arab schools, they are not desper- 
ately needed. The issue seems rather to lie with the ambiguous rela- 
tionship between the schools and the state authorities as well as between 
the respective movements that organise the education. As pointed out 
by Gomez-Perez, authorisation, recognition (including subsidies and even 
secondment of state teaching personnel) of any one school does not 
entail recognition of the certificate or degree awarded by a non-official 
school. While some certificates are tolerated, the baccalaureat is not recog- 
nised, and students are thus de facto excluded from official higher edu- 
cation (Gomez-Perez 1999: 66) and consequently from a considerable 
segment of the job market. On the other hand, the Franco-Arab schools 
do not always comply with the official curriculum and inspections are 
inadequate or simply not taken into account. 
Attempts to tackle these problems by starting to integrate the Franco- 
Arab system with the official system through uniformisation of Franco- 
Arab programmes met with resistance in the organisations. Gomez- 
Perez attributes this positioning to the fact that the organisation of 
educational activities provides associations and individuals with financial 
means, external contacts and networks and a certain prestige and sta- 
tus locally, regionally and even nationally. The associations are very 
reluctant to give up that prerogative (Gomez-Perez 1999: 67). When it 
comes to defending the merits and necessity of religious education as 
such, the associations and other Muslim organisations rally behind the 
same position against the secular authorities. The traditional Qur'anic 
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schooling system has repeatedly been questioned by the Senegalese gov- 
ernment and by UNICEF, on the basis of the harsh treatment of the 
residing taalibes.9 This is also an issue of concern for Muslim organisa- 
tions such as JIR, but 'outside' intervention in this matter is looked 
upon with fundamental distrust. On one occasion the JIR vigorously 
attacked the signing of the Convention of Children's Rights and accused 
humanitarian organisations of trying to take over the Qur'anic schools 
with the intention of damaging Islam. Le Musulman fulminated that 
'progress is not the same thing as deviation' (Le Musulman 43, p. 14, 
1993) and traditional Qur'anic schools subsequently got regular cover- 
age on its pages. 
The Arab funds received by the associations are used not only for for- 
mal education. Many of them also organise numerous 'cultural activities' 
to promote Islam. Apart from the ecoles franco-arabes, JIR also organises 
summer camps for Qur'anic study, cultural events, discussion sessions 
and ecrans timoin.'0 The purpose of awareness-raising and preaching 
is the 'moralisation' of Senegalese society and its youth in particular. In 
an editorial entitled 'Viatique de la jeunesse musulmane', published in the 
journal of the movement, the editor emphasises that Senegalese youth 
needs to be called to Islam, as the majority is currently a victim of 
Satan. While the youth is the hope of the country, many succumb to 
the seductions of drugs, alcohol or adultery. '. . . Yet others', the edi- 
tor continues, 'the partisans of the least effort, have nothing else to do 
but to steal and to make music! Do you think that the development 
of our country will be brought about by such a youth?' (Le Musulman 
43, p. 30, 1993). While the JIR is best embedded amongst the edu- 
cated, it also conducts its preaching activities in popular quarters and 
factories. Themes to be discussed are chosen according to the audience 
involved: students discuss different matters from merchants or workers. 
The 'cultural activities' are supported with some social services: the 
movement has a few centres where they have small dispensaries, the 
members of JIR (men and women) visit hospitals and prisons to pro- 
vide moral but also material support for the patients and inmates. They 
organise regular collections of mainly food and clothes, which they dis- 
tribute amongst the poor. In co-operation with a number of interna- 
tional Islamic NGOs (e.g. Zakat House Kuwait, the World Association 
of Muslim Youth, the International Islamic League"), they have some 
small projects in rural areas, mainly the digging of water wells and the 
building of mosques. The JIR sees its activities as 'complementary' to 
what the state is doing, or in fact as a coming to the rescue of the 
state, which is not capable of doing certain things in the field of social 
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services. However, the JIR and the state do not have the same 'sources 
of inspiration' as one of the officials called it (Ibrahima L6, 7 July 
1999). They claim to respect the 'lIgalite republicaine', but also point out 
that they do not go along with whatever projects the state proposes. 
The example was given of a project in the field of sexually transmit- 
table diseases and HIV-prevention where the JIR was invited as a 
'respectable organisation' to participate. They refused on the grounds 
that it was not in keeping with their convictions, as they refuse to pro- 
mote other means of prevention than abstention for the unmarried. 
Yet, it was emphasised that, despite any differences in conviction and 
instruments between the authorities and the association, 'all JIR activ- 
ities are public and legal' (Ibrahima L6, 7 July 1999). 
3. Socio-cultural ction 
While socio-cultural action is for JIR only a secondary activity, some 
organisations, mainly consisting of influential and well-connected Muslim 
intellectuals, make it their most important occupation. The socio- 
cultural action is less directed towards 'preaching' in the narrow sense 
and proselytisation as such. Most of the activities consist of publishing 
articles on religious themes (often scientists are invited to contribute as 
well) and organising conferences or round tables. The atmosphere sur- 
rounding these activities is generally rather academic than prosely- 
tising and aimed at the well educated. Sometimes charitable initiatives 
are deployed on top of the cultural activities, albeit generally modest 
in scope. 
The Cercle d'Etudes Islam et Developpement (CERID) was founded in 
1984. The initiators and the membership are francophone and western- 
educated; a number of them are former Marxist militants. It is a high 
profile and select organisation: candidate-members have to be proposed 
by two current members and subsequently accepted by the bureau (Art. 
5, Charter CERID). Amongst its members CERID counts profession- 
als like doctors and lawyers, university professors, senior managers and 
teachers. Although the association is by many authors (e.g. Gomez- 
Perez 1991) classified as an 'Islamist' organisation, this seems not to be 
true of the affiliation of its members. Its current president, Ibrahim 
Mahmoud Diop (dit 'Barham'), is a prominent Sufi leader, an 'arabisant 
close to the Parti Socaliste (Khadim M'Backe, 26 June 1999). But the 
membership includes different allegiances and some opposition sup- 
porters are also represented. The organisation targets an educated, fran- 
cophone audience and publishes (irregularly-only five issues have been 
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published since 1984) a Bulletin du CERID with articles by its members 
and reports of its activities. 
The first Bulletin gives an account of how CERID was set up as an 
answer to allegations of 'secular' intellectuals, that Islam was an obsta- 
cle to 'development'. CERID states that Islam fosters 'development' 
rather than being an obstacle to it: 'The building of an inhabitable 
universe, a [common] life based on socio-economic development is 
always linked with the submission to God, who is the source of progress 
and transcendence' (Bulletin n? 1, 1986: 2). CERID points out that Islam 
is a civilisation founded on the universality of knowledge and spiritu- 
ality, reason and wisdom, and therefore cannot be a source of under- 
development. Moreover, underdevelopment is on the contrary to be 
attributed to non-adherence to Islam. Islamic civilisation died when 
Muslims became decadent, no longer defended their superior system 
and indulged in materialism. Muslims are in trouble now, because they 
no longer follow Islam and thus become vulnerable to outside attacks. 
The image of Islam as it is spread by its enemies is misleading and 
malicious: 'it is a valid way of living and the Islamic message is one 
of progress and renewal' (Bulletin n? 1, 1986: 2). 'To ban the eternal 
values of Islam as a point of reference for the Senegalese... is noth- 
ing less than deliberately throwing back this people to the level of what 
Levy Bruhl called... the primitive mentality' (Bulletin n? 1, 1986: 4). 
The relation between CERID and the government has been rather 
ambiguous. CERID has long been refused permission to broadcast cul- 
tural programmes on national television, which is controlled by the gov- 
ernment, on Muslim holy days and festivals (this policy has recently 
been reversed). On the other hand, CERID's 1989 seminar on the 
'Scientific miracles of the Qur'an and the Sunnah' got considerable 
coverage in the official government daily Le Soleil (Le Soleil, 22 Nov. 
1989). The government also provided the association with land: CERID 
is currently in the course of finishing a new Muslim cultural centre, 
including a school, an adult formation centre, a mosque and a refec- 
tory (Mbacke, 26 June 199912). The association claims intellectual open- 
ness to different positions in politics. There is no common position 
taken on political issues or policy in general, except for the promotion 
of Islam as a civilisation, an identity and a moral standard. This does 
not prevent individual members of the Cercle from criticising the gov- 
ernment over certain issues. They do this, however, in a personal capac- 
ity: moreover, says Khadim Mbacke, editor in chief of Bulletin, in their 
capacity as intellectuals (in the strong French sense of the word) they 
are supposed and obliged to be 'critical'. Some members of the Cercle 
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were critical of the PS government; others, like the president, Barham 
Diop, are close to the party. Khadim Mbacke himself, now head of 
the department of Islamology at IFAN/UCAD, has written a doctoral 
dissertation on the involvement of the Senegalese in the pilgrimage to 
Mecca. The research addresses the problem of the 'financial haemor- 
rhage' Senegal faces as more and more Senegalese take part in it. 
Mbacke points out that Senegal needs the hard currency to finance its 
economic and social development (Mbacke 1991). Over the last few 
years the number of CERID's activities has declined and the Bulletin 
has stopped appearing regularly. One member attributed this to the 
persistent lack of funds due to the construction of the cultural centre. 
Another member pointed out, however, that the reduced activity is at 
least partly attributable to continuous 'infiltration' from the JIR during 
the past eight years. JIR was too radical and not prepared to com- 
promise. This allegedly resulted in frictions and misunderstandings 
between members. As the Cercle is open to people from any political 
or Muslim background, it is prone to be an instrument in inter-religious 
and political rivalry. 
One ex-member of CERID, Momar Kane, is now member of the 
Organisation pour l'Action Islamique (OAI). Like the JIR, the OAI was born 
out of the Union Culturelle Musulmane. It is presided over by the former 
leader of UCM, Cheikh Toure, a member of an influential family within 
the Tijaniyya tariqa. The OAI has inherited the radicalism of the JIR, 
but unlike the latter it is not a mass organisation. More significant are 
the intellectual contributions of individual members. The OAI also 
seems to attach somewhat more importance to issues of social justice; 
yet, it is not active in the field of social work or in education. The 
journal of the organisation, Etudes Islamiques, devoted considerable col- 
umn space to articles against secularism and in support of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran. The last issue of their journal was published in April 
1990. Its demise was said to be mainly due to lack of funds and the 
general logistic difficulties of publishing anything in Senegal. However, 
members of the organisation publish in the journals of other organisa- 
tions, for example the JIR's Le Musulman. Momar Kane, lecturer at the 
Ecole superieure des Travailleurs Sociaux in Dakar, asserts that the Senegalese 
crisis is centred on a lack of morality in the hearts and minds of the 
people who rule the country. To gain popular support for the devel- 
opment effort, it should be pursued in a genuinely Islamic spirit, as 
people only work and strive for what they believe in. Yet, the gov- 
ernment has abandoned the Islamic social system for policies designed 
and imposed by foreign agencies, while enriching themselves. Islam 
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rejects all this compliance, resignation and unethical behaviour. The 
Islamic social system can be reconciled with the modern world and has 
something to add. The teachings of Islam contain the very values that 
are the foundation of development, Kane noted. The ethics of Islamic 
leadership are based on faith, 'or patriotism if you like'. This faith guar- 
antees a different attitude towards leadership: good behaviour will be 
rewarded and bad practice or abuse of power will be punished by the 
Creator in the hereafter (Momar Kane, 25 June 1999). Despite refer- 
ring repeatedly to Marxist jargon, concepts and analysis, Kane insists 
that Marxism cannot be the solution as Marxists lack the moral and 
ethical force resulting from faith: they can therefore not be just rulers. 
Action Solidarite Islamique (ASI) shares OAI's criticism of the govern- 
ment. President of the organisation is Cirei Ly, medical doctor at Point 
E, Dakar, and one of the founding members of the UCM. Dr Ly insists 
on the importance of resistance against the secular state: the govern- 
ment is currently not capable of conceiving its own policy, but is totally 
dependent on the former coloniser, France. Independence is only nom- 
inal and a 'Mafia economique' dominates the country's economy. The gov- 
ernment is corrupt and submissive to western governments; national 
elections cannot change anything about it, and are, in any case, fraud- 
ulent. However, Dr Ly pointed out that ASI, as an NGO, has no polit- 
ical doctrine or ideology. The organisation is not interested in politics 
in the current situation. It aims to break the vicious circle of corrup- 
tion and dependence by moralising the society. When government and 
citizens would adhere to Muslim morality, everyone would have a bet- 
ter life, materially as well as morally. Islam is not only prayer: it is also 
about moral and social rules (Cirei Ly, 10 July 1999). The ASI con- 
siders its vocation as mainly 'cultural' and directs the bulk of its efforts 
towards organising and attending conferences and instructing Muslims 
and Muslim converts on how to practise Islam (prayer, Ramadan, the 
practice of Zakat). In addition, the organisation assists Qur'anic schools 
and training in agriculture in rural areas and has a dispensary in Thies. 
Despite the rather harsh criticisms the president of ASI directs towards 
the secular state and its government, the relation is somewhat ambigu- 
ous. On conferences organised by ASI, there are always high-ranking 
state representatives present. Each time a full report of the occasion 
was published in Action Islamique, the official publication of OSI. At the 
second ASI Congres Ordinaire (January 1993) on 'International Islamic 
Solidarity' the President of the Republic, Abdou Diouf, was represented 
by Serigne Lamine Diop, minister of Justice. Also present were the 
adjoint and the chef de cabinet of the Governor of Dakar, a number of 
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anciens ministres, representatives of amongst others the PS and the PDS 
and representatives of the embassies of Morocco, India and France 
(Action Islamique, March-April 1995). On the occasion of the opening of 
the third Congres Ordinaire (May 1998) on 'Religion, Politics and the 
Family', Moustapha Niasse, minister of State and minister of Foreign 
Affairs and representative of President Diouf, declared: 'Le President Diouf 
vous assure de son soutien actif' (Action Islamique, July-August 1998). During 
the interview, Dr Ly pointed out that the state does not censor the 
publications of ASI and moreover that the state subsidised the last con- 
ference to the amount of 1 million francs CFA and contributed 100,000 
CFA for the opening ceremony (Cire Ly, 10 July 1999). 
Some intellectuals active in the socio-cultural organisations deployed 
some initiatives beyond study and discussion. In 1987, Khadim Mbacke- 
responsible for the CERID Bulletin-founded the Fonds Senegalais de 
Solidarite Islamique (FSSI). The organisation aimed to 'reinforce the sol- 
idarity, promote collaboration and to fight for the social and material 
well being of the needy without distinction and in compliance with the 
shari'a'. Members of the Fonds would be expected to contribute 25,000 
FCFA per annum personally to the activities of the organisation (Le 
Soleil, 1 July 1988). Planned projects included the setting up of a cen- 
tre for women's vocational training and a school for religious educa- 
tion (Vuarin 1990: 614), and some socio-economic projects based on 
the principle of micro-credit. The amount of the contribution scared 
many people away according to Mbacke, leading to a somewhat bit- 
ter but ardent appeal in Le Soleil (19 April 1990). In the article Mbacke 
points out that Islamic action is much too oriented towards cultural 
activities and conferences and not enough attention is being given to 
social problems. He suggests that some Senegalese Muslims who definitely 
do have the means to contribute to the social action of FSSI consider 
themselves 'too important' to do so and that some others are 'simply 
afraid and ashamed to be considered integrists should they actively 
engage in Islamic [social] works'. They prefer to contribute instead to 
secular organisations and charities 'which they consider as being bet- 
ter managed'. Others still 'pretend they have no time and think that 
they can reconcile themselves with God when they retire from profes- 
sional life'. He proposes to conduct sociological research into 'the 
real motives' of Muslim personalities who refuse even the smallest col- 
laboration with Islamic organisations in the field of aid to the poor. 
Mbacke finally points out that 'one cannot be a good Muslim when 
one is not at the service of his equals, in other words, a good agent of 
development'.13 
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4. Reproductive health care and family planning 
Reproductive health and family planning are sensitive and difficult 
issues in African Muslim societies. The 1994 UN conference on pop- 
ulation and development held in Cairo provoked a lot of reaction in 
Senegal. However, the attitude of Muslim leaders and organisations was 
not univocal. Some organisations such as JIR refuse to consider any of 
the concerns voiced at the conference, dismissing them as a Western- 
Christian plot to harm Muslim societies. In Le Musulman it is argued 
that what the West calls the 'demographic bomb' is in fact the source 
for the future 'sustainable development' of Senegal. The article argues 
that it is at least partially due to their demographic weight that the 
USA and the USSR succeeded in becoming superpowers. The only 
reasons why the West wants to curb population growth is malicious 
'neo-Malthusianism', a 'security psychosis as western countries start to 
fear new barbarian invasions' and 'the pressure of feminist movements 
wanting to cause women to revolt by allowing them to decide by them- 
selves about issues of procreation'. According to Le Musulman, all reference 
made to 'development' by the Cairo summit is deliberately misleading 
and 'too simplistic an alibi as shown by the insignificant space it is attrib- 
uted in the final document: six pages out of 83'. The 17 billion USD 
associated with the implementation of the measures are a mere 'ransom 
for a satanic programme geared at the depopulation of the planet' (Le 
Musulman n? 47, pp. 4-5, 1994). 
Rather a different point of view is held and disseminated by the 
NGO Reseau Islam et Population (RIP). The Reseau was founded at the 
instigation of the Ministry of Finance and Planning and the UN 
Population Fund in the aftermath of the Cairo Conference. It is how- 
ever an autonomous organisation bringing together experts in Islamic 
religion, imams, researchers and representatives of the maraboutic fam- 
ilies. It is presided over by Professor Ibrahim Mahmoud Diop (dit 
Barham), the Secretary General of the Ligue des Oulema du Maroc et du 
Senegal and president of CERID. The organisation works together with 
other 'Reseaux' to promote knowledge, reflection and discussion on mat- 
ters of family planning and reproductive health. Different 'Reseaux' exist 
which target, amongst others, women, traditional authorities and the 
elderly; RIP is specifically aimed at religious leaders and their con- 
stituencies. The organisation wants 'to clarify the population policy and 
wants to show the interest of Muslims in adopting family planning, 
because often they are victims of propaganda which portrays the West 
as the main promoter aiming to reduce and to weaken the Muslims' 
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(Kebe sd: 6). RIP aims to make certain aspects of family planning 
acceptable to religious leaders and heads of family and wants to do so 
from an Islamic point of departure, using arguments illustrated with 
Qur'anic references. Two channels are used to disseminate information 
and to generate discussion. RIP sets up workshops led by religious key 
persons and called 'education a la vie familiale' (EVF). The sessions address 
married men and women (separately) and provide sex education, infor- 
mation about sexually transmittable diseases (notably AIDS) and in- 
formation about methods for family planning (including the use of 
contraceptives). The methodology underlying the sessions is the RAPID 
system,'4 which has been developed in collaboration with academics 
from Johns Hopkins University. UN Population Fund, USAID and the 
Senegalese government finance the project. Apart from its work at grass- 
roots level, RIP has taken part in the publication of 'La declaration de 
politique de population a la lumiere de la jurisprudence islamique', conceived as 
an accessible work of reference for population issues. Every three months 
the organisation publishes the bilingual (Arabic and French) Bulletin 
Islam et Population, with articles discussing reproductive health issues 'from 
an Islamic point of view'. A lot of attention is given to taking the edge 
off certain 'miscomprehensions and prejudices' attributed to Islam (Kebe 
1998a: 2). One example of these miscomprehensions is the position of 
women in Islam. 
Abdul Aziz Kebe, the Secretary General of the organisation, explained 
that true Islam does not permit certain practices, which stem from local 
custom. Violating the physical integrity of humans is forbidden in Islam 
and therefore female circumcision-still widespread in Senegal-is not 
a practice authorised by Islam. The emphasis has to be on the well- 
being of the woman and the family in general. Special attention has 
to be given to the education of women. A conservative mentality imply- 
ing certain conceptions of the role of women in Islam could be an 
obstacle to development. RIP tries to diffuse different, more progres- 
sive interpretations of Islam, illustrated with examples from the Qur'an. 
Kebe himself, author of a 'Repertoire thematique des versets coraniques rela- 
tiffs lafemme' (Kebe 1998b) and holder of a doctorate in Arabic, asserts 
that although Islam explicitly forbids certain roles for women there is 
still 'enough room to manoeuvre'. Muslims have to discuss these issues 
and agree on dynamic interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence: the gates 
of ijtihaad have to be opened for society to progress (Kebe, 6 July 1999). 
RIP itself, as an organisation, has not taken a firm position on the 
practice of female circumcision. Some of the religious leaders within 
RIP approve of the practice and point out that Islam does not forbid 
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it. Yet others maintain that female circumcision is not an Islamic, but 
a traditional practice, which has to be stopped. Other issues as well 
are permanently debated within the Reseau. Although abortion is ille- 
gal under Islamic law, certain Muslim leaders nevertheless reportedly 
argue that women who have undergone an abortion are entitled to 
medical care, since doctors have to come to the rescue of everyone 
who is in need of help, as demanded by the Qur'an (Wilson 1998: 14). 
Discussion also takes place between the Reseau and religious leaders out- 
side the network. Not all the religious leaders agree with the generally 
very progressive position of the Reseau concerning family planning. In 
November 1997 the Reseau was attacked by some religious leaders who 
accused it of being 'bought' with the money of foreign stakeholders. 
They virulently criticised the initiative of the Reseau to promote the use 
of condoms in an AIDS awareness campaign (Wilson 1998: 14). 
The Reseau is not the only organisation concerned with family plan- 
ning and reproductive health. Local partners include the Association 
Nationale des Imams et Oulema du Sine'gal (ANIOS), Institut Islamique pour le 
Developpement (ICHRA), the Institut Islamique Africain Americain (IIAA) and 
several individual Muslim leaders (Kebe 1998a: 4). Serigne Modou 
Bousso Dieng, the son of the second Khalifa General of the Mourides, 
has set up health posts in rural areas under his spiritual guidance, where 
he also provides services for family planning. The medical equipment 
of the health posts has been provided by UNPF. ANIOS promotes 
Islamic reflection on issues related to the status of women, family plan- 
ning and population. The organisation has branches all over the coun- 
try. Activities include religious broadcasts on state television as well as 
independent radio stations, preaching and the hosting of conferences. 
ANIOS also promulgates Islamic 'opinions' concerning family planning 
and EVF. 
Similar activities, but more at grassroots level, are conducted by 
ICHRA. The Khalifa General of the Layenes actively supports the 
organisation.'5 It organises awareness-raising talks and presentations in 
traditional villages to make people aware of the issues around Islam 
and family planning and has 'taken some courageous positions con- 
cerning female circumcision and family planning' (Kebe 1998a: 4). A 
network of women was set up by ICHRA to introduce other women 
to these issues in private. With the support of the tariqa and under the 
aegis of ICHRA, Education a la Vie Familiale will be introduced in Qur'anic 
schools in a test phase. Where the schools of the official system (pri- 
mary and secondary state schools) already made some arrangements to 
allow for EVF in the curriculum, ICHRA will lead the way for the 
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ecoles franco-arabes and the Qur'anic schools to follow. The dahiras16 and 
the women's groups under the supervision of ICHRA will be involved 
in similar initiatives (Le Soleil, 14 July 1999). The organisation empha- 
sises that boys and girls have to be educated to be able to participate 
in the 'development of their country'. For the same reason, ICHRA pays 
special attention to women's issues: women have to 'return to the place 
that was originally accorded to her by Islam'. All traditional customs 
that fall short of the rights accorded to women by Islam and prevent 
women from taking their rightful place have to be eradicated. Concerning 
initiatives in the field of gender rights, the NGO has worked in close 
co-operation with the Senegalese government. The Khalifa General of 
the Layene tariqa has been an avid supporter of the PS government. 
The Senegalese authorities honoured him with the Ordre National du 
Lion. On this occasion he promulgated an official religious order to 
'support the President in all his undertakings' (Le Soleil, 12 July 1999). 
The gender theme is also one of the major points of concern for 
IIAA, another RIP partner. IIAA is directed by Cheikh Assane Cisse, 
a prominent religious leader and marabout from the Niassenes, a branch 
of the Tijaniyya tariqa. IIAA is registered as an international NGO 
based in Senegal. It deploys activities in the United States, Senegal, 
Gambia, Mauritania, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso 
and Benin. Cisse works together with different UN agencies including 
UN Development Programme, UN Population Fund and ECOSOC's 
committee for fighting desertification, as well as with the Senegalese 
and United States Governments. Its self-stated purpose is to 'develop 
a capability for sustained self-help in the areas of education (religious 
and secular), agricultural development, health care, economic develop- 
ment and cultural change' (Web Pages IIAA, 11 August 1999). IIAA 
runs a project of adult education to foster literacy especially amongst 
women, supported by the publication of a small newspaper in easily 
understandable language with 'news from the world'. The NGO runs 
a school where American and West African children are educated in 
Qur'anic study and secular subjects, including English, maths and com- 
puter literacy (Cheikh Aassane Cisse, 11 July 1999). Initiatives in the 
field of family planning include a dispensary in Kaolack Medina, 'under 
the medical direction of Khadijah Cisse, a board certified American 
physician' (Web Pages IIAA, 11 August 1999). IIAA installed a sewage 
system in the M6dina of Kaolack and has recently been involved in a 
reforestation project (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 1998: 61). One other 
offshoot of the Niasse family, Ahmed Niasse, also founded an Islamic 
international NGO. The Institut Islamique Agricole was set up when Ahmed 
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Niasse reconciled himself with the government of Abdou Diouf after 
serving time in prison for burning the French flag and calling for the 
establishment of an Islamic republic. Not much is known about the 
organisation's activities. It is suspected that there are not too many, as 
the NGO is allegedly just an instrument to channel Gulf money to 
finance the lifestyle of the President-fondateur of the IIA. The Government, 
happy that they had appeased him, did not interfere (Mohamad Seidou 
Ba, 5 July 1999). 
Yet another formerly active opposition member, the ex-Marxist jour- 
nalist Abdoulatif Gueye, set up his own NGO in 1988. Jamra, originally 
founded as a reformist publication is mainly concerned with problems 
affecting the urban youth. These problems (such as drug addiction, 
prostitution and AIDS) are attributed to the state of Jahalia Senegal is 
currently in. Jamra's aim is to work towards the moralisation of state 
and society. The organisation has a reputation of being opposed to the 
tariqas, the state and the political parties, although Vuarin asserts that 
it received support from the ministry of social development and sev- 
eral international organisations (Vuarin 1990: 613). Gomez-Perez points 
out that it is also careful to maintain good relations with the leader- 
ship of the tariqas (Gomez-Perez 1994). Most of Jamra's activities seem 
to be in the field of care for and detoxification/resocialisation of drug 
addicts. However, the organisation has also been mentioned in con- 
nection with the programme for family planning that RIP is partici- 
pating in (Wilson 1998: 26). 
5. Final Remarks 
In the discourse of socio-political actors in Senegal, 'development' is 
presented as a common aim of the Senegalese, by the state, secular 
and Muslim organisations alike. Muslim organisations engage in the 
discourse of development and deploy some social activities that can be 
designated as 'developmental'. Yet, 'development' means different things 
to different people. A highly nuanced and varied discourse is constructed 
around the term 'development', which should be seen in the wider con- 
text of power relations in the Senegalese polity. Muslim organisations 
in general put a lot of emphasis on the need for 'Islamic development', 
entailing a more ethical, and a more moral approach. Islam is pre- 
sented as a valuable cultural framework in which to conduct 'devel- 
opment', which will motivate the Senegalese themselves to do their 
work properly and to accept certain sacrifices for that purpose. This is 
put in contrast with the perceived position and actions taken by the 
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secular state. Some organisations and individuals, notably JIR, OAI, ASI, 
accuse the secular state of promoting development that is alienating, 
too dependent, unislamic. Although the Muslim organisations are at times 
each other's allies, they are also each other's rivals. They sometimes 
accuse each other of promoting unislamic development and accuse other 
organisations of being 'bought'. Notably the JIR has reproached other 
organisations cooperating with the state in the field of family planning 
that they were co-opted by the state and its international 'partners'. 
Yet, all Muslim organisations discussed have some sort of working 
relation with the state, with some getting political or even financial sup- 
port from it. Even organisations highly critical of the government seem 
to accept a degree of state patronage. This evidence raises three impor- 
tant issues. The cooperation with Muslim associations provides the 
authorities to a certain extent with access to a population they would 
not otherwise have access to concerning difficult issues such as family 
planning. Muslim organisations and individuals both use 'Islam' at one 
and the same time to distance themselves from the state and to benefit 
from the resources the state can provide, or indeed to access some of 
the power that is associated with the state or its bureaucratic institu- 
tions. It can be used as a discourse of dissent but at the same time it 
represents symbolic capital that also appeals to the state. As pointed 
out by Van Hoven (2001) the Senegalese state increasingly uses Islam 
as a legitimising instrument for its own authority. Similarly, Muslim 
organisations cannot avoid referring to 'development' if they wish to 
access some of the resources associated with it, as well as the symbolic 
capital one can gain from claiming to contribute to 'development'. 
Appropriating the 'development' discourse provides them with the oppor- 
tunity to access resources and networks they would otherwise not have 
access to. It provides them with financial and political leverage towards 
their own constituencies and even the state. Organisations such as RIP 
can at least partially contribute to and to a certain extent control the 
population aspect of the state's development policy. At the same time, 
however, adopting that very development discourse makes Muslim organ- 
isations vulnerable to ambiguous strategy on the part of the state. This 
is shown in the example of schooling: the state goes along with the 
Muslim organisations to the extent of seconding state personnel to the 
ecoles franco-arabes, but refuses to recognise the degrees awarded by 
the schools. The state thus chooses to deny the schooling provided by 
Muslim associations any official 'developmental' value. It seems keen 
to keep Islamic associations in their 'niche' of religion, morality or cul- 
tural activities and out of the 'official' sphere, while at the same time 
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cooperating with them and appropriating Islam as a legitimising dis- 
course. Muslim associations and their individual leaders or members 
try to protect their prerogative of religious-moral authority and legiti- 
macy, but at the same time are entering the 'official' sphere the state 
regards as its walled garden. 
The discourse of 'development' and 'Islam' and the interplay between 
them are functional in the context of competition and negotiation 
amongst political actors in Senegal. The result observed is very com- 
plex and multifaceted. 'Muslims' are not pitted against the 'secular state' 
concerning 'development', or the other way around. To be sure, in a 
country where 95% of the population is Muslim the 'secular state' appa- 
ratus mainly consists of Muslims. On the other hand, the membership 
of Muslim organisations is not at all homogenous and there is a fair 
deal of disagreement and competition between them. Many prominent 
members of Muslim organisations have strong political or even per- 
sonal links with the 'secular state'. Designating oneself as a 'Muslim' 
or a 'Muslim organisation' in a particular political context is essentially 
a 'political' act, a matter of creating a functional (political) 'other'. 
Attaching 'developmental' value to something is also a 'political' act: it 
attributes a degree of legitimacy in a context dominated by 'develop- 
ment' ideology. By claiming 'Islamic development' and playing with the 
content of these two concepts according to the power-political context, 
'Muslim' organisations and personalities claim political space from the 
'secular state' as well as from each other. Although this needs further 
detailed research, the process might allow them to manoeuvre them- 
selves in an optimal negotiation position for co-optation by state and 
eventually to win recognised political participation. 
NOTES 
1. The author wishes to thank Louis Brenner, Christopher Parker, Muriel Gomez- 
Perez, Abdul Aziz K6eb and Elizabeth Sirriyeh for their comments. 
2. They are not involved in party politics, are not linked with one political party or 
another, they do not participate in the parliamentary process. 
3. 'Non-governmental organisation' here refers to a concept as opposed to a legal 
status. 
4. The officially registered NGOs, national and international, are governed by an 
agreement they concluded with the Senegalese state under the law that regulates NGOs: 
Dicret no 966-103 du 6fevrier 1996 mod#fiant le decret no 89-775 du 30juin 1989 fixant les 
modalites d'intervention des organisations non gouvernementales. Officially, there is no distinction 
made by the state between confessional ('Islamic' or other) and non-confessional NGOs. 
The secularism of the state has to be respected and the NGOs are not allowed to par- 
ticipate in any political activity, be it nationally or internationally (Mohamad Seidou 
Ba, 5 July 1999). 
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5. 'Islamic' here refers to a declared philosophical/religious affiliation by the organ- 
isation rather than to the (religious) background of individual members. 
6. UPIS is designated as embodying the relation between the Tijaniyya and the 
Arab world. It runs a vocational training centre (Centre Faical), funded by Saudi Arabia 
and several schools over the country (Vuarin 1990: 612). 
7. UPIS claims to run about a hundred, as cited in Vuarin (1990: 612), Fall (1993: 
201) suggests the number of 968 schools founded. 
8. The case was cited of a factory closure where the children of laid-off workers 
had their fees waived, as was also the case with the children of returning Senegalese 
after the conflict with neighbouring Mauritania in 1989. 
9. Taalibis at traditional Qur'anic schools often have to provide their own food by 
begging in the streets and their living conditions at the marabout's quarters can be very 
poor. 
10. This is a session in which the participants watch a film and later discuss the 
most important issues and dilemmas involved in the plot. 
11. A senior official of Zakat House and another consultant who had worked 
in Islamic NGOs before tended to downplay the co-operation with organisations 
like the JIR. Maybe the projects were so insignificant that they did not even remem- 
ber, maybe they thought it was not opportune to maintain a high profile on their 
co-operation. 
12. The bulk of the funding for this project was provided by Saudi Arabia, Algeria, 
Morocco and the Islamic Development Bank although the operation was scaled down 
considerably after the second Gulf War (Mbacke, 26 June 1999). 
13. My emphasis. 
14. RAPID stands for Ressources pour l'Analyse de la Population et son Impact sur le 
Diveloppement. 
15. A small tariqa populated by the Wolof-speaking Lebu population north of Dakar. 
16. Urban religious communities. 
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